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Abstract—Online social networks such as Facebook allow
users to control which friend sees what information, but it can
be a laborious process for users to specify every receiver for each
piece of information they share. Therefore, users usually group
their friends into social circles, and select the most appropriate
social circle to share particular information with. However, social
circles are not formed for setting privacy policies, and even the
most appropriate social circle still cannot adapt to the changes of
users’ privacy requirements inﬂuenced by the changes in context.
This problem drives the need for better privacy control which
can adaptively ﬁlter the members in a selected social circle
to satisfy users’ requirements while maintaining users’ social
needs. To enable such adaptive sharing, this paper proposes a
utility-based trade-oﬀ framework that models users’ concerns (i.e.
potential privacy risks) and incentives of sharing (i.e. potential
social beneﬁts), and quantiﬁes users’ requirements as a trade-
oﬀ between these two types of utilities. By balancing these two
metrics, our framework suggests a subset of a selected circle
that aims to maximise users’ overall utility of sharing. Numerical
simulation results compare the outcome of three sharing strategies
in randomly changing contexts.
I. Introduction
Online social networks provide people new opportunities
for interaction and socialization. As a result, users’ personal
information, including proﬁle data, location and activities
are increasingly shared with online friends via online social
networks, comprising families, friends, coworkers and even
strangers. With the dramatically increased number of users and
amount of information sharing, the question of whether online
social networks provide users good privacy control over their
personal information is particularly important.
Online social networks such as Facebook and Google+
allow users to control which friends see what information, but
users who are not aware of privacy often share information
without considering who should (or should not) access it. Even
privacy-aware users sometimes may make wrong decisions
because of a lack of skill and information about risks and
consequences of sharing [2], [17]. Moreover, specifying every
receiver for each piece of information they share can be a
laborious precess, especially when they have several hundreds
of online friends [13]. Users thus usually share information
by choosing the most appropriate social circle from their pre-
deﬁned social circles which are grouped according to diﬀerent
types of relationships, e.g., family, classmate, living in the
same city, etc. However, social circles are not formed for set-
ting privacy policies, and rather are relatively static groupings
of diﬀerent types of friends [15]. For privacy management,
users require dynamic social circles to match each of their
sharing intentions, and these social circles must be able to
adapt to the changes of users’ privacy requirements which are
inﬂuenced by contextual factors [5], [16], such as sensitivity
of information, trustworthiness of information receivers, etc.
However, these changes are not predictable when forming
social circles. Therefore, better privacy control is needed,
which can capture these changes at runtime and then adaptively
ﬁlter the members in users’ selected sharing circles each time
before sharing their information.
There have been several attempts to solve this adaptive
sharing problem [3], [6], [4]. These studies make the assump-
tion that users are privacy-aware and their historical sharing
decisions do not cause privacy problems. They proposed
schemes that automatically form new social circles to adapt to
users’ changing context and sharing requirements, by predict-
ing users’ decisions based on their historical ones. However,
because users may make poor decisions, these schemes may
adversely aﬀect users’ privacy. A novel approach to determine
the optimal sharing decision within the selected social circle
rather than just predict decisions that are most likely to be
chosen remains an open research topic. In particular, it requires
an analytical framework to predict, quantify and trade-oﬀ the
potential privacy risks and social beneﬁt with respect to each
of the information receivers in the selected social circle. This is
a challenging and fundamental problem. Indeed, if we cannot
quantify and trade-oﬀ these, we will not be able to determine
with whom users should share in the selected social circle,
given particular information in a given context. The trade-oﬀ
between the potential social gains and privacy risks of sharing
requires users’ own preferences over them, and hence users
must be involved and the framework must be able to take into
account users’ preferences every time they share.
Simplifying social networking scenarios on the basis of
two popular privacy threats [8], we assume four possible
activities information receivers may undertake regarding the
information: re-share, misuse, respond, and do nothing. We
will describe the details of our threat model and these activities
in §II. Given the threat model and these four activities,
we select several contextual factors for the quantiﬁcation of
potential sharing risks and beneﬁts. By using these factors, we
illustrate how to build a utility-based trade-oﬀ framework that
quantiﬁes users’ privacy risks and social beneﬁt for sharing
their information with each of the members in the selected
sharing circle. We then study the trade-oﬀs between these
two types of utility under diﬀerent settings of these factors.
Finally the trade-oﬀs enable our solution for adaptive sharing
to recommend that users should share information within an
optimally selected social circle, adapting to changing contex-
tual factors at runtime. The eﬀectiveness of our adaptive shar-
ing framework is evaluated with a simulation of randomised
contextual factors.
II. Motivating Example
A. Sharing activities and social circles
Users have a range of information-sharing activities in
various online social networks, such as making their proﬁle in-
formation visible, posting their location, photos and any other
personal related information, and sending private messages to
people whom they are socially connected with, and so on.
We generalise these information-sharing activities as disclosing
some information to at least one friend. We assume that the
friend(s) who receive(s) the information has/have a choice of
four actions to perform using the information:
Re-share: the information receiver re-shares the information
with her own friends.
Misuse: the information receiver uses the information for
improper purposes, such as stalking, identity theft, sending
spam messages, etc.
Respond: the information receiver leaves comments on the
information, or express opinions about it, such as the Like
function on Facebook.
Do nothing: the information receiver does not do anything
about the information, except for seeing it.
Note that the ﬁrst three activities are not mutually exclusive,
information receivers may do them at the same time.
Users usually group their friends into diﬀerent social cir-
cles to manage friends relationship, such as immediate family,
university friends, and so on. Conveniently, users pick one or
more social circles to share a speciﬁc piece of information,
instead of selecting friends individually. However, users can
still exclude/add friends individually from/to the selected social
circles. The ﬁnal chosen friends to receive the information
form a new social circle for this particular information sharing,
and we name it selected social circle, in which our adaptive
sharing approach aims to ﬁlter the members.
B. Privacy threats
In this paper, we focus on two types of privacy threats
based on a privacy investigation survey [8] on Facebook users.
• Stranger danger Social networking users are con-
cerned about the visibility of their information, the
survey [8] found almost half of their participants
prohibits strangers from viewing their information.
However, once the information is received by the
selected sharing friends, users lose control over it.
Information receivers may re-share the information
with their own social circles, making the information
more visible [9]. We name the people who are not
original in users’ selected sharing circle as unintended
recipients.
• The insider threat Facebook reports that the aver-
age user has 130 friends [1]. These can be broadly
categorised as “immediate family”, “school friend”,
“socialised with”, “coworker”, “friend have not met”,
etc. Diﬀerent groups of friends naturally represent
diﬀerent trustworthiness of receiving information [8].
Untrustworthy friends have a greater likelihood of
misusing the information. Sharing all information with
all the friends without ﬁltering them causes privacy
risks.
C. A motivating example
To have a concrete example, we consider a user Alice (a)
who has two social circles: University Friends and Coworkers
as depicted in Fig. 1. To share a particular piece of infor-
mation, for instance, Alice selects University Friends as the
selected sharing circle. Friend Bob (b) and Charlie (c) are thus
accessible to the information. This selection seems to satisfy
both Alice’s social needs and privacy requirements. However,
privacy might be violated. For instance, assuming Bob is not
trustworthy, he misuses the information trying to stalk Alice.
Then he should be avoided if privacy is the sole aspect that
Alice cares about. Alice’s privacy might also be violated if
Bob re-shares the information, strangers h and g will see it.
Sharing the information with Charlie in this case is safer, as
his social connections are within Alice’s social graph. But if
the social aspect is considered as well and interacting with
Bob brings Alice great social beneﬁt, e.g., getting important
comments from him, then he might be still worthy of being
chosen as the potential social beneﬁt outweighs privacy risks.
Fig. 1: Social connections of user Alice, Bob and Charlie
The challenge of this example is how to predict the
potential privacy risks and social beneﬁt of sharing with each
member in the selected social circle, and help Alice trade-oﬀ
between them to maximise her utility of information-sharing.
This assistance is particularly important when users are not
able to evaluate privacy risks and social beneﬁt on their own,
due to large number of friends in the selected circle, and as
well as a lack of information about contextual factors.
III. Model and Metrics
As explained previously, this paper focuses on the analysis
of trade-oﬀs between privacy risks and social beneﬁt, which we
believe to be key of solving the adaptive sharing problem. In
this section, we model users’ information-sharing by a utility-
based trade-oﬀ model and assume users are rational agents
trying to maximise their own utility.
A. A trade-oﬀ model
We consider a user i who intends to share her personal
information infoi with one of her social circles. The selected
sharing circle includes n friends, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}
where n ≥ 1. With regard to each friend j ∈ N, user i typically
has two actions Share and Not share, respectively denoted
by S and N . For simplicity, this paper is only interested in
these two actions, and do not consider the situation where
users may lie about their information. These two actions are
thus independent of i and j. We write ui j(S) and ui j(N) for
i’s utilities of respective action S and N with respect to an
information receiver j. This paper evaluates users’ utilities
by taking into account two factors: potential privacy risks
and potential social beneﬁt caused by users’ strategic actions.
These two factors need to be traded oﬀ against each other,
as privacy risks and social beneﬁt are usually associate with
the same sharing decision. Note that typically a user does not
suﬀer any privacy loss if she does not share, but she does
not gain any social beneﬁt neither. Therefore, we always have
ui j(N) = 0. We deﬁne the utility function under action Share
as follows.
Deﬁnition 1: (Utility) For user i, the utility function ui j(S)
describes the payoﬀ to her under her action S with regard
to the information receiver j. We assume that the utility
function is a linear function over two factor functions ri j(S)
and bi j(S) representing the potential privacy risks and social
beneﬁt respectively1. By using a weight parameter wi ∈ [0, 1]
to indicate i’s privacy preferences, we have
ui j(S) = (1 − wi)bi j(S) + wiri j(S) .
Here the privacy risk function ri j(S) is non-positive as it
reﬂects the loss of sharing. As ui j(N) = 0 always holds, action
S is an optimal action for i if her utility of sharing ui j(S) is
greater than zero. Formally:
Proposition 1: An optimal action d∗i j for any j ∈ N is
determined as
d∗i j = arg maxs∈{S,N}
ui j(s) =
{ S ui j(S) > 0,
N otherwise.
Now we deﬁne the optimal decision for user i with respect to
all j in the selected social circle N.
Deﬁnition 2: (Optimal decision) D∗i = {d∗i1, . . . , d∗in} is an
optimal decision for user i and the optimal overall utility can
be evaluated as ∑
j∈N
ui j(d∗i j) =
∑
j∈N,ui j(S)>0
ui j(S) .
To determine the optimal action and achieve the optimal
utility, we focus on the computation of ui j(S) for the rest of
this section.
B. Metrics for predicting privacy risks
The metrics quantiﬁes users’ potential privacy risks under
the given threat model described in Section II; the greater the
absolute value of the quantiﬁcation, the greater the privacy
threat to users. Naturally, privacy risks depend on the sensi-
tivity the user assigns to the information, and the estimated
amount of information leakage under the given threat model.
The basic assumptions of our quantiﬁcation of privacy risks
are the following.
• The more sensitive information a user shares, the
greater her privacy risks.
• Given our assumed threat model (i.e., stranger dan-
ger and the insider threat), the more information is
1In order to make these two factor functions ri j(S) and bi j(S) comparable,
we normalise them to the same range between zero and one. There are other
ways of comparing factors which cannot be directly compared, e.g., [10]. This
paper does not focus on selecting the best approach to do the comparisons.
predicted to be leaked to unintended recipients and
untrustworthy friends, the greater the user’s privacy
risks.
The following examples illustrate these two assumptions.
Example 1. Assume user i assigns high sensitivity to her
work-related information and low sensitivity to the city she
lives with regard to her social circle of University Friends.
Sharing the work-related information is more risky.
Example 2. Assume user i has two social circles, Family
and Friends she never met. Sharing information with the
second social circle is more risky, as it results in information
accessed by less trustworthy friends.
According to these two assumptions, we deﬁne the metrics
of privacy risks of user i to be a monotonically increasing
function of two parameters: the sensitivity of information and
predicted information leakage of sharing. Formally, we have
Deﬁnition 3: (Privacy risks) For user i, the sensitivity of
information infoi is denoted by αi and depends on i’s opinion
on infoi. The predicted information leakage is denoted by
fi j(S) depending on i and also the information receiver j. The
potential privacy risks for an information-sharing action with
j, denoted by ri j(S), can be any combination of sensitivity and
information leakage. For simplicity, the paper uses the product
operator to combine them.
ri j(S) = − fi j(S) × αi
where fi j(S) and αi are both normalized to the range of [0, 1].
Thus ri j(S) will be normalized to [−1, 0].
The sensitivity level can be obtained by asking for explicit
user’s feedback, for instance, using a 5-point Likert scale that
ranged from “high sensitivity” to “not sensitive at all”, with
“medium sensitivity” as the neutral option. We then assign
the scores to each of the options from the range of [0, 1],
particularly 1 for “high sensitivity” and 0 for “not sensitive at
all”. The sensitivity level can also be obtained by analysing
users’ historical sharing decisions [11]. We leave the question
of which approach should be chosen for future work. We now
describe the computation of information leakage below.
We measure users’ predicted information leakage by adopt-
ing the information-theoretic framework [12] which is widely
used to measure the amount of information leakage in se-
cure systems. In particular, we use Shannon’s deﬁnition of
entropy to quantify the predicted information leakage caused
by users’ sharing behaviours: how much knowledge about the
sharing information infoi are learned by unintended recipients
and untrustworthy friends. Our proposed measurement model
compares the information obtained by unintended recipients
and untrustworthy friends after the selected friends receiving
the information. Before the selected friends receiving the
information, unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends
have no idea about it if they do not have any auxiliary
information. However, after receiving it, some amount of the
information may be leaked to them and then their uncertainty
about the information decreases. Naturally, if the information
leakage is normalised to the range of [0, 1], then it is one if
unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends are sure about
the information, representing the information is completely
leaked; and zero if they still know nothing about it.
Let Vi denote the set containing all possible values that
infoi may indicate. The number of elements in Vi is denoted
by k where k ≥ 1. For example, if infoi is a photo and indicates
i’s gender, then Vi is { f emale,male} and k is equal to 2. Let
X denote the discrete random variable with probability mass
function Pr(X = x), where x represents each possible value
that X may take. Here x corresponds to an element in Vi.
The probability Pr(X = x) reﬂects the knowledge that unin-
tended recipients and untrustworthy friends have about infoi.
Assuming unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends do
not have any auxiliary information, they are able to guess i’s
gender correctly with probability 0.5 without seeing the photo.
We then denote by H(X) the entropy of a speciﬁc social
networking application for protecting i’s private information
infoi. It represents the uncertainty of unintended recipients
and untrustworthy friends on infoi. For each value X might
take, unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends assign
a probability Pr(X = x). According to [12], H(X) can be
evaluated as
H(X) =
∑
x∈Vi
Pr(X = x) log
1
Pr(X = x)
.
Now we apply the measurement to our information-sharing
scenario, we have
Lemma 1: If unintended recipients and untrustworthy
friends have no auxiliary information about infoi, then
H(X) = log k .
Proof: As unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends
have no information on infoi before i shares it, the probability
Pr(X = x) for each x in Vi is uniformly distributed, which is
1/k. H(X) can be evaluated as
H(X) = k × 1
k
× log 1
1/k
= log k .
Let Yj be the event that i shares her information infoi with
j, and H(X | Yj) be the entropy of the social networking
application for protecting infoi given event Yj. By applying
Bayes’ Theorem, we have
H(X | Yj) =
∑
x∈Vi
Pr(X = x | Yj) log 1Pr(X = x | Yj) . (1)
Now we compute H(X | Yj) by considering the two types of
threats caused by the sharing action. For the stranger danger
threat, the probability that each information receiver j re-
shares a speciﬁc piece of information determines the predicted
information leakage. Naturally, the higher the re-sharing prob-
ability, the greater the information leakage to the unintended
recipients. For the insider threat, the information is completed
leaked if at least one information receiver misuses it. However,
before sharing the information, user i does not know whether
each of information receivers, say j will misuse it or not. But
she has knowledge on j that how trustworthy j is, based on her
previous interactions with j. Therefore, if j is given a high trust
level by i, then there is less information leaked to untrustworthy
friends. We deﬁne these two parameters as follows.
Deﬁnition 4: (Re-sharing probability) The probability
that an information receiver j, j ∈ N re-shares the information
infoi with her own social connections is denoted by pi j.
The value of pi j can be easily derived by monitoring the ratio
of the number of times that j re-shares over the number of
times that j receives information from i in a speciﬁc social
networking application.
Deﬁnition 5: (Trust level) The trust level of an informa-
tion receiver j, j ∈ N, in user i’s points of view, is denoted by
ti j and ti j ∈ [0, 1], where ti j = 1 represents j is fully trusted by
i and ti j = 0 represents j is not trustworthy at all.
The value of ti j can be obtained by asking for user i’s trust
opinion on j, or deriving from the group type that j belongs
to. For instance, j will have a high trust level if he belongs
to i’s immediate family social circle. It is also possible to
obtain the value by deploying some reputation schemes in
social networks.
Based on these two parameters, we compute H(X | Yj) as
follows.
Lemma 2: If unintended recipients and untrustworthy
friends have no auxiliary information about infoi, then
H(X | Yj) =
∑
x∈Vi
Pr(X = x | Yj) log 1Pr(X = x | Yj)
=
k − (k − 1)ti j(1 − pi j)
k
log
k
k − (k − 1)ti j(1 − pi j)
+
(k − 1)ti j(1 − pi j)
k
log
k
ti j(1 − pi j) .
For the extreme cases when pi j = 1 or ti j = 0, we assume
H(X | Yj) is equal to zero.
Proof: Detailed in [18].
The amount of information that unintended recipients and
untrustworthy friends learn from the sharing event can be
expressed as H(X) − H(X | Yj). In order to normalise the
value, we divide it by H(X). We then obtain the normalised
information leakage of sharing as follows.
Proposition 2: The information leakage of user i for shar-
ing her personal information infoi to j is evaluated as
fi j(S) = 1 − H(X | Yj)H(X)
where H(X | Yj) and H(X) are computed in Lemma 1 and 2.
For the extreme case with k = 1, we assume fi j(S) is equal
to zero in that unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends
certainly know infoi irrespective of whether i shares it with j
or not. This equation quantiﬁes the information that sharing
behaviour leaks, in particular, fi j(S) = 1 means unintended
recipients and untrustworthy friends know the information
completely; and fi j(S) = 0 means sharing behaviour does not
leak any information.
Note that since the measurement of information leakage is
based on particular threat models (e.g., stranger danger and
the insider threat in this paper), the result is not applicable to
all possible threat models. But our measuring model is ﬂexible
and able to be applied under diﬀerent threat models.
C. Metrics for predicting social beneﬁt
In the previous section we developed an information-
theoretic model that quantiﬁes users’ potential privacy risks
in terms of the sharing behaviours. In this section we focus
on users’ social beneﬁt bi j(S) and measure how much user i
is predicted to gain by sharing infoi with j. In this paper, the
social gains are evaluated by considering the following two
aspects.
• User i gains social beneﬁt if her information is seen
by information receiver j and j belongs to the selected
sharing circle. We denote this beneﬁt as Φ(1)i j (S).
• Interactions between i and j. As described in the
respond activity in §II, due to the sharing, user i has
opportunities to interact with j. In particular, j may
comment on i’s sharing, or show her opinions (e.g.,
Like), or any kind of responses to it. They may then
have further interactions regarding j’s responses. This
type of social beneﬁt is denoted by Φ(2)i j (S).
In order to capture the essence of these two aspects, we ﬁrst
deﬁne a general function of social beneﬁt as a combination of
all types of beneﬁt.
Deﬁnition 6: (Social beneﬁt) For user i, the social beneﬁt
bi j(S) describes the social payoﬀ to her under her strategies S
in terms of information receiver j. We assume that the utility
function of social beneﬁt takes the form of a linear combination
of functions Φ(β)i j , each accounting for a type β of social beneﬁt,
relevant to the speciﬁc application. That is, using a weight
parameter viβ ≥ 0 to indicate the (relative) weight that user i
attributes to type β, then
∑
β viβ = 1 and
bi j(S) =
∑
β
viβ · Φ(β)i j .
Given i’s preferences denoted by vi ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − vi
respectively over these two types of social beneﬁts in this
paper, we deﬁne the function of social beneﬁt as follows.
Lemma 3:
bi j(S) = viΦ(1)i j (S) + (1 − vi)Φ(2)i j (S)
This paper only considers these two types of social beneﬁt, but
our measurement framework is ﬂexible and able to add other
types of beneﬁt for speciﬁc applications. In order to normalize
both Φ(1)i j (S) and Φ(2)i j (S) to [0, 1], we deﬁne Φ(1)i j (S) = 1 as i’s
seen beneﬁt is fully satisﬁed. Next we evaluate the interaction
beneﬁt Φ(2)i j (S).
Let mi j denote the ratio of the number of interactions (e.g.,
comment, like, etc.) between i and j over the number of times
that j receives information from i. It represents the average
number of interactions for a single sharing event. The value of
mi j can be easily obtained by monitoring i’s historical sharing
behaviours and interactions with friends. We use the ratio mi j
to estimate the i and j’s interactions for a new sharing event.
We divide it by the maximum interaction ratio for diﬀerent j
due to the normalisation, the interaction beneﬁt Φ(2)i j (S) can be
evaluated as follows.
Lemma 4:
Φ
(2)
i j (S) =
mi j
max
j∈N
mi j
.
Now we have the social beneﬁt of i under strategy S
evaluated as follows.
Proposition 3:
bi j(S) = vi + (1 − vi) mi jmax
j∈N
mi j
.
As presented in Proposition 3, when user i only considers
the seen beneﬁt, i.e., vi = 1, the social beneﬁt bi j(S) becomes
independent with j and is always one under strategy S. This
illustrates the situation where a user uses social networks
for disseminating information and does not care about the
responses received from the information receivers. Her social
requirement is fully satisﬁed as long as the selected informa-
tion receiver j receives it, and her social beneﬁt increases as
the number of receivers (i.e., the size of N) increases.
D. The trade-oﬀs and decision making
In this section, we investigate how to trade-oﬀ privacy risks
against social beneﬁt in order to enable user i to make an
optimal decision.
We substitute the computations of privacy risks and social
beneﬁt from Proposition 2 and 3 in our utility deﬁnition (see
Deﬁnition 1), and then evaluate whether ui j(S) for each j ∈ N
is positive in order to determine the optimal action d∗i j (i.e., S
or N). Our utility function is rewritten as
ui j(S) = (1 − wi)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝vi + (1 − vi)
mi j
max
j∈N
mi j
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ − wi
(
1 − H(X | Yj)
H(X)
)
αi
From the above equation, the utility ui j(S) is a decreasing
function of the privacy preference wi, we have
Proposition 4:
∂ui j(S)
∂wi
≤ 0.
Therefore, the more user i is concerned about privacy, the less
utility she obtains by sharing the information with j. Clearly,
when social beneﬁt is the sole factor taken into account, the
share action S is the optimal action. On the other hand, when
privacy risk is the sole factor, the not-share action N is the
optimal one as ui j(S) is always negative.
Diﬀerently from the extreme cases above, ﬁnding the
optimal action that maximises ui j( ) in real applications
under particular circumstances relies on the real values of
the parameters in Eq. (2). In the next section, by resorting
to simulation techniques, we simulate the values for these
parameters by assuming some distributions, and then illustrate
the results under diﬀerent parameter settings which represent
diﬀerent circumstances.
IV. Evaluation
In this section we analyse how trust level and re-sharing
probability inﬂuence the predicted information leakage, and
apply our proposed trade-oﬀ model in order to investigate
the eﬀectiveness of adaptive sharing, compared with the other
two approaches, i.e., always sharing and probabilistic sharing
which will be described in §IV-B, with and without the re-
share restriction.
A. On the analysis of information leakage
As discussed in Section III-B, the predicted information
leakage of an information-sharing event depends on three
parameters: trust level ti j, re-sharing probability pi j and the
number k of possible values that infoi indicates. To investigate
the inﬂuences caused by trust level and re-sharing probability,
we set k = 5 and vary ti j and pi j.
Figure 2 shows the predicted information leakage changes
when the trust level and re-sharing probability respectively
increase from zero to one. Information leakage is an increasing
function on re-sharing probability, and decreasing function on
trust level. Therefore, to mitigate privacy risks, users should
share information with friends who have high trust level and
low re-sharing probability.
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(a) Information leakage decreases as trust level in-
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Fig. 2: Information leakage as ti j and pi j vary; (k = 5).
B. Comparisons among three sharing approaches
To investigate the eﬀectiveness of adaptive sharing, we
consider an information-sharing example as described in our
motivating scenario (see §II). Here user Alice intends to share
her information with her University Friends circle. We extend
the number of friends in this selected circle from two to one
hundred, that is N = {1, . . . , 100}. We consider Alice’s weight
parameter towards her two types of social beneﬁt vi = 0.2,
and the number of possibilities that the information indicates
k = 5. By assuming a normal distribution, we generate the
trust level ti j, re-sharing probability pi j, and average number
of interactions mi j (∈ [0, 1]) for each j in N.
We now describe the three sharing approaches investigated
in this example.
• Always sharing represents that Alice shares with all
of the members in N without considering her potential
privacy risks and social beneﬁt.
• Probabilistic sharing represents that user i makes the
sharing decision Share or Not share depending on a
probability (e.g., 0.5 in this example).
• Adaptive sharing refers to our solution that Alice
shares only with the optimal friends in N.
As shown in Figure 3, adaptive sharing always outperforms
the other two approaches. The overall utility of Alice under
diﬀerent privacy preferences is always the greatest, regardless
whether the sensitivity of the information is high, or medium,
or low. When privacy is the sole utility taken into account
(i.e., wi = 1), adaptive sharing prevents the negative utility
by adopting the optimal decision Not Share for all of the
members. Clearly, if the user only considers her privacy, the
best strategy is not disclosing any information. Moreover, the
utility diﬀerence between adaptive sharing and the other two
approaches increases as the sensitivity level of the information
increases. Therefore, adaptive sharing saves more loss when
the information is highly sensitive.
C. Re-share restriction
In order to limit the number of unintended recipients,
Facebook currently has a restriction on re-share activity: only
mutual friends of the information sharer and re-sharer can
see. That is, the information will not ﬂow outside the social
connections of the information owner. To make the restriction
stronger, we disable re-sharing function to restrict the infor-
mation within the selected social circle. Due to this restriction,
the re-sharing probability pi j in our model becomes zero. We
next investigate how the optimal decision changes with the
re-share restriction.
We use the same information-sharing scenario as in our
previous example, and set wi = 0.5 for simplicity. That is,
user Alice views her privacy and social beneﬁt to be equally
important. Figure 4a, 4b and 4c depicts Alice’s utility of
sharing with diﬀerent members in the selected sharing circle.
The x-axis is the identity number of each member in the
circle, from 1 to 100, and the y-axis is the corresponding
utility. The round markers are the utilities when there is no
re-share restriction, while the triangle ones are those with re-
share restriction. For utilities which are greater than zero, i.e.,
markers which are above x-axis, the optimal decision is Share;
and Not Share when they are below the axis.
As shown in Figure 4a, when the information is highly
sensitive, most markers under the x-axis are in round. That is,
re-share restriction makes the user’s utility greater (marked in
triangle), and fewer members are assigned the decision of Not
Share compared with the situation where re-share restriction
does not take place. We show respectively the number of
markers above and below the x-asix in Figure 5a. With re-
share restriction, the optimal decision for 81 members is Share,
and the remaining 19 Not Share. When there is no re-share
restriction, Share is the optimal decision for only 58 members.
Figure 4b shows that the user’s utility of sharing increases
when the information is of medium sensitivity. In this case,
fewer markers are below the x-axis. When the information is
of low sensitivity as shown in Figure 4c, the utilities for all
members are greater than zero regardless the re-share restric-
tion, thus for all j, the optimal decision is Share. Therefore,
re-share restriction is eﬀective for reducing privacy loss and
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(b) Medium Sensitivity αi = 0.5
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(c) Low Sensitivity αi = 0.1
Fig. 3: The overall utility of sharing as wi and αi vary; (n = 100, vi = 0.2, ∀ j,mi j = 50, k = 5).
has more inﬂuences on the optimal decision in our adaptive
sharing when the information is highly sensitive.
V. Related Work
We have identiﬁed several attempts to solve the adaptive
sharing problem.
Fabeah, et al. [3] proposed the idea of developing an
automated grouping technique that analyzes users’ social graph
and sharing behaviours, and then identiﬁes new social circles
to give users usable and meaningful groupings of friends
for sharing their information. This approach enables users to
choose a more suitable social circle when they want to share a
particular information, but it cannot eﬀectively adapt to users’
changing privacy requirement and context as the circles are
derived without considering these important factors.
Fang and LeFevre [6] proposed a template for the design
of a social networking privacy wizard. The idea is to let users
assign “labels” (e.g., share or not share) to a set of selected
friends, then by taking these as inputs for their machine
learning model, the wizard generates the same (resp. opposite)
labels for the other remaining friends who are in the same
(resp. diﬀerent) circle. The wizard asks users’ sharing opinions
for the selected friends each time users initiate a sharing, and
seems to adaptively satisfy users’ changing requirements of
information-sharing. However, this approach works well under
two assumptions: friends in the same social circle bring the
user the same consequences of sharing, and users are able to
understand the risks of sharing and are fully privacy-aware.
Bilogrevic et al. [4] built an adaptive information-sharing
system for mobile social networks. The system uses a machine
learning approach to monitor users’ sharing decisions under
diﬀerent contexts. Then the system predicts decisions for new
sharing requests based on these previous decisions and new
context as well. The system also assumes users are fully
privacy-aware, but the assumption may not be true for average
users in real world and by using this system, users’ privacy is
not better protected.
In this paper, we focus on a utility-based trade-oﬀ frame-
work that models the consequences of sharing into utilities by
taking into account users’ privacy preferences, social require-
ments and as well as contextual factors. By evaluating diﬀerent
utilities under diﬀerent sharing decisions, we obtain an optimal
decision and recommend it to users to support their decision-
making. Acquisti [2] discussed the economics literature that
relates to trading-oﬀ the loss against beneﬁt of sharing personal
information. Squicciarini and Griﬃn [14] studied how users
decide whether to disclose, share or lie about their information
in a game-theoretic approach by evaluating their utilities under
these three strategies. In their model, the beneﬁt and loss of
sharing are deﬁned as two generalized functions and their
evaluations for real applications have not been investigated.
Ioannidis, Pym and Williams [7] developed a mathematical
model to ﬁnd the optimal decisions for organizations when
they deploy information security policies. This study models
the trade-oﬀs among several properties of information security
by combining the measurements of these properties into a
utility function.
Another challenge explored in this paper is the measure-
ment of privacy risks and social beneﬁt. We try to predict
and measure the information leaked to unintended recipients
and untrusted friends who cause the potential privacy loss. In
this paper, a measuring model is proposed based on Shannon’s
entropy [12] and combined with the sensitivity of the sharing
information, users’ privacy loss is computed. A similar work
was done by Liu and Terzi [11] and they deﬁned a mathemat-
ically sound methodology for computing users’ privacy scores
of their privacy settings in online social networks. They took
the sensitivity of the sharing information as the main factor,
and the more sensitive a user shares the lower score the user
gets. Unlike this work, we consider the amount of information
leakage as also an important and necessary factor. Even though
some information has high sensitivity, the potential privacy
risk is zero if it is not leaked to any unintended recipients or
untrustworthy friends.
VI. Conclusion and Future Work
Privacy management is an important problem in online so-
cial networks. Existing privacy control is neither adequate nor
eﬀective in adaptively deciding the sharing circles to satisfy
users’ changing sharing requirements in diﬀerent contexts.
This paper has proposed a utility-based trade-oﬀ framework
that models and quantiﬁes users’ adaptive sharing requirements
as utility of potential privacy risks and social beneﬁt. By
balancing these two metrics, the proposed framework recom-
mends users a subset of the selected sharing circle each time
they initiate an information-sharing action, which can always
maximise users’ overall utility. Numerical simulations show
that our approach of adaptive sharing outperforms “always
sharing” and “probabilistic sharing”, especially when the in-
formation is highly sensitive. The simulations also show that
the re-share restriction is eﬀective for protecting privacy.
We plan to extend our approach in the following directions.
First, we plan to further investigate adaptive sharing problem
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(c) Low sensitivity αi = 0.1
Fig. 4: Utility of sharing with each j, from number 1 to 100.
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Fig. 5: The percentage of Share and Not Share.
from a game-theoretic perspective. Speciﬁcally, we plan to
extend our modelling framework to analyse users’ incentives
for sharing/not sharing. Second, we plan to investigate how
to engineer an adaptive system to realise our adaptive sharing
framework. We will explore well established adaptive system
engineering theory to investigate how to monitor and assign
values to those parameters in our framework, how to do
the analysis and decision planning in real social networking
systems, how to eﬀectively provide sharing suggestions to
users, and how to update the values of parameters after users
make ﬁnal sharing decision. Finally, we plan to implement
our framework in a social networking application and evaluate
using a user study to investigate users’ sharing experiences
with and without our adaptive sharing recommendations.
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